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Globalization, Civil Society and
Citizenship in Turkey: Actors,
Boundaries and Discourses
E. FUAT KEYMAN and AHMET ICDUYGU
In recent years, civil society has become one of the most important concerns of
academic and public discourse. It would not be a mistake to propose that today
there is a strong, effective and even over-glorified talk about and a global
agenda for civil society and its role in the process of creating a better and
humane world. In this talk and agenda the main intention is to reinvigorate and
strengthen civil society politically, organizationally and normatively as a coun-
ter-hegemonic and resistance movement against the state-centric world. This
paper argues that Turkey does not constitute an exception in this context.
Rather, it provides an illuminating case-study in which the crisis of the
state-centric modernity has given rise to the elevation of civil society to the
status of being an extremely important actor and arena for the democratization
of the state–society relations. However, on the basis of the three-year-long
research (1999–2002) we have done on ‘the impacts of globalization on Turkey’,
the paper also argues that the role of civil society in the process of democratiza-
tion should be considered a necessary but not a sufficient condition, insofar as
it contains both democratic and essentialist discourses about citizenship and
identity. In order to substantiate these arguments, the paper will first outline the
internal and external factors that have paved the way to the emergence and the
increasing importance of civil society in Turkey, and then will shift its attention
to the question of ‘the use and the abuse of civil society’. In seeking a proper
answer to this question, the paper will focus on the discourses and strategies of
different civil society organizations about state, society, citizenship and identity
in Turkey.
As we enter the new millennium, it appears to be more and more difficult, if not
impossible, to think of politics only with reference to the ‘national context’.
Such modern referents of politics as the nation-state, national identity and
national economy have been losing their explanatory power for the analysis of
social and political change, as a result of the process of increasing interconnect-
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edness of societies, making ‘national context’ vulnerable and exposed to global/
regional and local pressures. In fact, what David Held describes as globalization,
that is, ‘the widening, the deepening and the speeding up of the interconnected-
ness’ in our increasingly globalized world, is forcing us to think of our societal
affairs beyond ‘the national context’ (Held et al., 1999).
It can be argued, in this sense, that globalization constitutes a set of historical
processes, generating important effects in the ways in which societal affairs in
a given national setting are constructed, as well as in the mode in which they are
analyzed. While the process of economic globalization, that is, the globalization
of capital, is challenging and undermining the authority of nation-states by
creating ‘a borderless global market place’, the process of cultural globalization
is rendering the idea of national development problematic by giving rise to the
emergence of ‘alternative modernities’, cultural identities and the clash between
the universal Western values and the particular/local claims to authenticity.
These processes also reflects on the formation of politics in a national setting, by
creating ‘the limits of politics’ in terms of its boundaries and its actors (Strange,
1992). In this sense, we observe that as a conditioning factor of political action
and discourse, globalization limits the ability of political actors both to maintain
their dominant position in national politics, and to reduce and confine the
boundaries of politics as ‘a territorially-sovereign and nationally-bound
activity’.1
As a result, we are no longer able to think of politics as a purely national in
terms of its actors and its boundaries. Whereas the boundaries and the parame-
ters of politics are being extended to global and local flows/interactions, its
actors multiply to the extent that they include inter-, intra-national and global
organizations, and their role and activities in solving problems related to the
human condition. One of the important sites at which the changing nature of
politics has occurred in a global-historical context is that of ‘civil society’, which
has been elevated to the status of the ‘key area’ for the possible democratization
of the world in which we live (Schechter, 1999).
It has been argued that as an area of public deliberation, civil society has to
be strengthened against the nation-state which has been the dominant focus/actor
of politics in modernity, in order to create the possibility of democratizing the
state–society/individual relations (Keyman, 2000a). This argument has been
based upon the common contention/assumption in academic and public discourse
that in time when the problems of modernity that have become global/local in
their nature and scope are increasingly requiring global solutions, the nation-
state itself is not capable at all any more of coping effectively with them and
providing effective policies to solve them. These problems, coming into exist-
ence as what Anthony Giddens has called ‘the radical consequences of
modernity’, being felt in every and each sphere of life, and generating crucial
changes in our relations with nature, with different cultures and identities, as
well as with ourselves, as the argument follows, have paved the way to the
emergence of the calls for participatory democracy, new actors beyond the
nation-state and the new language/discourse of politics (Giddens, 1987). It is on
the basis of this argument that civil society and civil society organizations have
been brought to the fore, even over-glorified, as a necessary condition and an
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important actor for ‘eradicating poverty, promoting democracy and good gover-
nance, resolving social conflict and protecting human rights’.2
It would not be a mistake to propose that today there is a strong and effective
talk about and a global agenda for civil society, even about the evolving global
civil society, and its role in the process of creating a better and ‘humane world’,
in which the main intention is to reinvigorate and strengthen civil society
politically, organizationally and normatively as a counter-hegemonic and resist-
ance movement against the ‘state-centric world’ (Dower, 1998; Ehrenberg, 1999;
Koh and Slye, 1999). It is however a mistake to attribute in an ipso facto manner
‘positivity’ to civil society, insofar as it involves not only democratic discourses,
but also essentialist identity claims, voiced by religious and ethnic fundamental-
ism, and arguing for reconstructing the state–society/individual relations in a
communitarian basis. In this sense, we should acknowledge that the global talk
about civil society contains both ‘the use and the abuse of civil society’, and
therefore that civil society is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
democracy (Keyman, 2000b).
It can be suggested here that Turkey, in this context, is not an exception: on
the contrary, during the last decade, Turkish society has undergone rapid
social/cultural, economic and political change. Moreover, as we will see, the
sources of change are located in the global–national–local context, giving rise
not only to the legitimacy crisis of the Turkish state and the emergence of the
alternative claims to Turkish modernity, but also to the increasing ambivalence
embedded in the process of Turkey’s integration into the European Union as a
full member. One of the important sites where we observe clearly the process of
change and its manifestations in Turkey is that of civil society, which has been
growing since the 1980s, especially during the 1990s, in terms of its qualitative
and quantitative importance for making Turkish society more liberal and
democratic than before. Indeed, there are almost 3000 civil society organizations
in Turkey today, whose activities involve a number of issues, ranging from
human rights to democratization, from peace to environment, from issue-specific
problems to even meta-societal visions such as Westernization, Atatürkism,
nationalism, and Islamization. Quantitatively, civil society organizations have
begun to play an important role in articulating and representing the various
ideological interests and political demands voiced by different segments of
society, as well as in transmitting to the political actors the societal calls for
democratization and the need for effective governing. In this sense, we can
suggest that the increasing role of civil society in Turkey especially during the
1990s has created ‘the relative autonomization of economic activities, societal
groups and cultural identities’, which has given rise to ‘an autonomous societal
sphere’ by realizing the shift in the focus of political practice ‘from the state to
society’ (Göle, 1994).
It should be pointed out, however, that the emergence of ‘an autonomous
societal sphere’ in Turkish politics as an outcome of the increasing activities and
importance (at least in a normative sense) of civil society organizations should
not be taken as a given positive development. Instead, while recognizing the
importance of this development for democratization, we should also recognize
the possibility of the use and the abuse of civil society, and therefore that we
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should analyze critically the actors of civil society in terms of their discourses
and strategies. In other words, as we will elaborate in detail, we should recognize
that the emergence of civil society involves not only the possibility of democra-
tization, but also serious problems, insofar as it constitutes a ‘discursive space’
both for democratic forces and for religious and the ethnonationalist political
strategies to voice their essentialist and anti-democratic identity claims. For this
reason, we suggest that civil society in Turkey involves a serious ‘boundary
problem’, since it functions not only as a necessary condition for democratiza-
tion, but also as ‘an important site’ for the activities of anti-democratic forces to
put their identity politics in practice.3
In order to substantiate this argument, we will first outline the internal and
external factors that have paved the way to the emergence and the increasing
importance of civil society in Turkey. Then, we will focus on the use and the
abuse of civil society by looking at the discourses and the strategies of different
civil society organization, in a way to delineate the way in which the boundary
problem of civil society has occurred. This will allow us to suggest that the
reason for the boundary problem is in fact historical, insofar as it is related to
the larger problem of ‘citizenship’ in Turkey. For this reason, in the last section,
we will attempt to provide a brief explanation of the (republican) citizenship
regime in Turkey, which has played an important role in the transformation of
civil society into a ‘site’ for the activities of political actors to exercise their
identity-based political strategies. In conclusion, we will make a set of sugges-
tions for the possibility of democratization in Turkey, for which, we still believe,
civil society should be supported as a ‘necessary condition’.
Situating Civil Society in a Global-Historical Context
The historical context, in which identity politics has occurred and influenced
Turkish social and political life, is not only national, but also global in nature.
The emergence of civil society is also embedded in this global context. More
particularly, it has been suggested that four distinct but nevertheless interrelated
processes have dictated both the direction of Turkish modernization since the
1980s and the way in which civil society has become an important actor in
Turkish politics.4 In this sense, these processes should be considered when
analyzing the current state of Turkish politics, where the center-Right and
center-Left political parties have continuously been declining in terms of their
popular support and their ability to produce effective and convincing policies,
while at the same time both the resurgence of identity politics and civil society
have become strong and influential actors of social and political change.
The first process is ‘the changing meaning of modernity’, that is, ‘the
emergence of alternative modernities’. Civil society organizations and intellectu-
als agree that since the 1980s, the process of Turkish modernization involved
new actors, new mentalities of development and new identity claims. This
means, first, the emergence of the critique of the status of the secular-rational
thinking as the exclusive source of modernity in Turkey, and second, the
increasing strength of Islamic discourse both as a ‘political actor’ and as a
‘symbolic foundation’ for identity formation. On the other hand, the alteration in
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the meaning of modernity also manifested itself in the emergence of the
language of civil society, civil rights, and democratization. Calls for the need to
think of modernity in terms of democracy created a context for the upsurge of
interest in civil society, citizenship, and the democratic self. Thus, since the
1980s, but especially in the 1990s and today, not only has the hegemony of the
secular and state-centric nature of Turkish modernity been challenged by
alternative claims to identity, politics and society, but also and more importantly,
we have seen the increasing presence of new actors with different societal
visions and political discourses in Turkish politics (Keyman, 2000b). In addi-
tions to Islamic discourse with its political parties, there have emerged important
and politically active civil society organizations, calling for the need to democ-
ratize the secular and state-centric model of Turkish modernity by making it
more liberal, more civil and more compatible with the language of ‘rights’. What
marks the nature of Turkish politics today is the existence (or the emergence) of
alternative claims to modernity in Turkish politics, carried out by new actors,
new discourses and new strategies, all of which share the common suggestion
that the secular and state-centric model of modernity is no longer able to govern
society efficiently and democratically.
The second process is related to ‘the legitimacy crisis of the strong-state
tradition’ in Turkey since the 1980s. Turkish modernization, since the beginning
of the Republic, has been characterized by and has given rise to the ‘strong-state
tradition’. This tradition means, first, that the state has assumed the capacity of
acting almost completely independent from civil society; second, that the state,
rather than the government, has constituted ‘the primary context of politics’; and
third, that the state has played a significant role, been involved in the process of
the production and reproduction of cultural life. The strong-state tradition has
functioned as the organizing ‘internal variable’ of Turkish politics up until the
1980s. However, since the 1980s, the emergence of new actors, new mentalities
and the new language of modernization, as well as democracy as a global point
of reference in politics, has made culture and cultural factors an important
variable in understanding political activities. Thus, the call for democratization
as the main basis for the regulation of the state–society has become the
global/local context for Turkish politics. This means that new actors acting at the
global/local levels and calling for democratization have confronted the privileged
role of state at the national level. In this sense, one of the important impacts of
globalization on Turkish modernization has been, and still continues to be, the
fact that the state has a legitimacy problem in maintaining its position as the
primary context for politics, as a result of the shift towards civil society and
culture as new reference points in the language and the terms of politics.
In order to understand these two processes, (1) the emergence of alternative
modernities and (2) the legitimacy crisis of the strong-state tradition, we should
also look at the changing structure of global relations in general, and the impact
of the ‘process of Turkey’s integration into the European Union as a full
member’ on the formation of Turkish modernization since the 1990s. We could
refer to both ‘the process of European integration’ and ‘the process of globaliza-
tion’ as those constraining factors that have had important short-term and
long-term impacts on the interaction of politics, polity and policy in the 1990s
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in Turkish politics. While the process of European integration means the
emergence of the democratic mode of regulation of the state–society relations in
Turkey, the process of globalization amounts to the intensification of economic,
political and cultural relations across borders, which makes it very difficult, if
not impossible, to think of politics without situating it into the global–national–
local context (Keyman, 1997).
In order to have a better understanding of the impact of the process of
European integration on Turkish politics and modernization, it is necessary to
briefly touch upon the membership affair of Turkey with the European Union.
After the European Council Meeting in Helsinki on 10–11 December 1999,
Turkey has been declared as an official candidate for full membership to the
European Union (hereafter, the EU). This decision started a process of pre-
accession including a transitional period of policy and legislation adoption and
harmonization (Hale and Avci, 2001). The adoption and the implementation of
the EU’s social, political and economic policies are imperative and the basic
requirement for the candidate state to become a full member. It should be
pointed out, however, that among these requirements, the adoption of the EU
acquis communitaire is of utmost importance, insofar as its implementation
inevitably results in the modification of existing domestic policies and practices
in various Justice and Home Affairs (Kirisci, 2002). In this process, the issues
of citizenship and civil society are vitally important to the European Commission
and its members. The importance to these issues has been reflected in the
Accession Partnership Document (APD)5 issued in 2000, in which the EU
Commission identified its short- and medium-term priorities, intermediate
objectives and conditions. These priorities and objectives are non-negotiable, in
that they constituted the basic criterion for the acceptance (as well as of the
rejection) of a candidate country, such as Turkey, into the EU as a full member.
As often referred to the political aspects of the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, the
membership requires that Turkey must achieve a strong democratic stability,
which ensures that the state governs society in accordance with the principle of
the primacy of the rule of law, the protection of human rights and the respect for
the minority rights. The Copenhagen criteria serve as a basis for the further
democratization of the state–society relations in a given candidate country such
as Turkey.
Since December 1999, the considerable political attention has been given in
Turkey to the necessary reforms to meet the political sides of the Copenhagen
criteria. It is within this context that in 2001, the government created the
‘National Programme’,6 which was designed to elevate the structure and quality
of Turkish democracy to the level of European democracy by creating a legal
foundation for the full protection of the individual rights and freedoms, the
freedom of thought and expression, the freedom of association and peaceful
assembly, and the enlargement of the space of civil society in Turkey. In the last
year, the government also made some revolutionary political, administrative, and
judicial reforms in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law:
these changes were directly related both to the further democratization of the
state in Turkey and to the reconstruction of the republican model of citizenship
in a way to make it more democratic and liberal. These reforms involved the
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abolishment of the death penalty, the elimination of the legal restrictions to the
rights of different ethnic communities both to education and to broadcasting in
their own mother tongues, and the granting and the non-Muslim religious
foundations the right to acquire property. These reforms, which were made in
accordance with the Copenhagen political criteria, are of utmost importance in
the creation of a strong language of rights in Turkey, which has a positive impact
on the democratization of the state and the enlargement of the space of civil
society. At the same time, it should be admitted that these reforms also indicate
that the sources of democratization in Turkey are no longer only national, but
also global, and therefore that the EU plays an important role in the changing
nature of the state–society relations in Turkey and functions as a powerful actor
generating system-transforming impacts on Turkish politics.
Likewise, the process of globalization, especially the increasing globalization
of markets and the growth of global communication, has yielded important
consequences for the political process in Turkey, as it acted as a structural
constraint on the economic policy options of the center-Right and center-Left
political parties. Actors commonly maintain that one of the impacts of globaliza-
tion on national politics is that it marks ‘the limits of politics’. As a result of
globalization, the differences that used to distinguish government policies
from opposition policies are in a process of disappearance. This manifests itself
especially and more clearly in policies regarding national economic issues, such
as production, trade, and finance. Two important conclusions can be extrapolated
here. The first is that the policy options of political parties are limited by
globalization. Second, the globalizing world creates serious problems, which
require effective and rationally formulated policies. Political parties alone cannot
produce effective solutions to problems and issues, such as environmental
risks, multiculturalism, and poverty, whose existence is increasingly affected by
the very process of globalization. In this context, supranational actors and civil
society organizations have become and act as ‘actors of politics’ as much
as political actors. Turkish politics does not represent an exception:
it is embedded in this process and globalization functions as a significant
external variable for understanding the current state of the political process in
Turkey.
These four factors, the emergence of alternative modernities, the legitimacy
crisis of the strong-state tradition, the process of European integration and the
process of globalization, are all situated at the intersection of the global–
national–local context. They indicate that since 1980, Turkish society has been
subject to ‘significant change’, in which the process of globalization operates and
generates impacts on societal affairs. By creating the global/local nexus whereby
modernity is articulated by different discourses of self, identity and culture,
globalization has brought about the possibility of the existence of alternative
meanings attributed to modernity, that is, to the co-existence of different cultures
with different interpretations of modernity. Thus the formation of Turkish
modernization began to carry in it ‘alternative modernities’ with different
political discourses of, and different future prospects for, Turkish social life. It
is in this context, created by these four factors, that civil society has also become
an important factor in Turkish politics.
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Globalization and Civil Society Organizations
As noted, since the 1980s, but especially during the 1990s, there has been an
upsurge of interest in exploring alternative ways in which socio-political change
in Turkey can be freed from the strong-state tradition. It is argued that
socio-political change involves more actors taking place outside the ‘political
center’, and thus produces a more ‘participatory political culture’. The sources
of this interest are located not only in the general societal dissatisfaction with the
strong-state tradition in Turkey, especially with respect to its increasing indepen-
dence from society and its concomitant failure to respond to social and cultural
demands and to cope with societal problems. The source for a more participatory
culture was not only related to the general belief that the state has increasingly
become unable to ‘cope with and manage effectively the changing nature of
Turkish economic and cultural life’. It is argued that the sources were also
‘global’ in nature, insofar as they have coincided with the globalization of the
interests and the activities of civil society organizations and non-governmental
organizations. The emergence of what is called ‘global civil society’ has also
provided both normative and institutional basis for the call for a more participa-
tory culture in Turkey. In this sense, a reference to globalization in terms of its
role in ‘the creation of the language of politics, which is not exclusively
associated with the state’ constitutes a common denominator among civil society
organizations.7
In other words, by creating a suitable platform for the ‘information society’,
in which knowledge becomes as important as labor, and gets transmitted and
disseminated throughout the world, cultural globalization makes politics and
democracy more ‘transitional’ in terms of actors and strategies. Thus, civil
society organizations find for themselves ‘a space to do politics’ between the
failure of the nation-state and the transnationalization of politics and democ-
racy, and attempt to include into the political agenda ‘the issue and the problem
areas around which they organize’. Civil society organizations are political
actors, but, unlike political parties, they focus on specific issue areas, such as
human rights, environment, peace, and the rights concerning gender, sexuality,
ethnicity and culture. In this sense, civil society organizations promote a
discourse of politics, founded upon the ‘language of rights’ which involves the
protection and the expression of civil rights that the process of democratization
requires. They promote a kind of (national and transnational) political activity,
which is democratic, non-hierarchical, and participatory, and is initiated ‘from
the bottom up’. In this context, it is believed that the activities of civil society
organizations have given rise to the process of the emergence of global civil
society, which is sometimes characterized as a process of ‘globalization-from-
below’.
In Turkey, the crisis of the strong-state tradition and the impacts of globaliza-
tion have together contributed to the significant qualitative and quantitative
increase in civil society organizations during the 1990s. Civil society organiza-
tion have been considered (a) an ‘indispensable element’ of the process of
democratization; (b) a ‘necessary factor’ to create stability in the relations
between Turkey and the European Union; and (c) an ‘important element’ of the
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modernization and the liberalization of the Turkish state, so that it transforms
itself into a political organization whose power and activities are ‘accountable’
to society. The discourse of civil society has been normatively supported and
actively promoted in academic and public life in Turkey during the 1990s. Thus,
civil society organizations have gained a ‘(political) actor-like quality’ with
normative and discursive power, influencing us to rethink the state–society/
individual relations beyond the strong-state tradition and by employing the
globalization of the language of civil rights.
The tragic and devastating events of 1999 have also led us to think of civil
society organizations seriously. The Marmara Earthquake on 17 August
destroyed a large portion of the most industrial region of Turkey, causing almost
20,000 deaths and thereby creating one of the most tragic events of the century,
and then there was the Düzce Earthquake on 12 November. These two disasters
made it very clear to Turkish people that the strong state is in fact very weak
in responding and coping with serious problems. This failure of the Turkish state
to respond quickly to crisis situations has given rise to a common belief among
people that civil society organizations and a more participatory political culture
are necessary for the efficient and effective solution of the problems confronting
Turkish society.
At the same time, the participation in research operations of several foreign
search and rescue teams and the global outpouring of help to people who lost
their families and homes, have created a point of articulation between globaliza-
tion and civil society in Turkey. The large amount of financial and moral help
coming from various societies, institutions and even individuals has created a
significant shift in people’s attitudes and behavioral patterns from a more
nationalistic view of the world to a more transnationalist and universalistic
approach to social relations. The normative value of civil society organizations
and their call for the global acceptance of the language of civil rights and the
participatory democracy has increased immensely in Turkey.
Having accounted for the reasons for the increasing importance of civil
society organizations in Turkey, and its ‘embeddedness’ in what is called ‘the
global talk of civil society’, it should be pointed out, however, that paradoxi-
cally, most of the civil society organizations in Turkey, in fact, see globalization
as ‘a process to be resisted in the long run’ or as ‘a problem to be seriously
dealt with in order to make its impacts positive for Turkish society’. In other
words, the general intellectual discourse of civil society, which sees globaliza-
tion as one of the contributory factors for the development of civil society
organizations in Turkey, does not correspond to the way in which civil society
organizations themselves speak about the utility of globalization. In other words,
civil society organizations appear to be ‘quite skeptical’ in the way in which they
approach the question of the long-term impacts of cultural globalization. This
skepticism sometimes operate in a strong fashion, to the extent that globalization
is seen as nothing but a new form of imperialism creating undemocratic power
relations in the world on behalf of rich countries. Sometimes, it takes the form
of seeing globalization as an objective reality that produces both positive and
negative impacts; positive in the sense of confronting the power of the strong
state and creating a platform for the protection of civil rights, and negative in the
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sense of supporting the liberal hegemonic vision of the world, based on free
market ideology. On the other hand, the leaders of some civil society organiza-
tions, such as citizenship initiatives, environmental organizations and organiza-
tions that are directly dealing with the problems of urban life, think of cultural
globalization positively as a process ‘internal’ to their activities.
For example, ‘Human Rights Organization’, which receives global support for
its activities, takes the strong skeptic position on globalization, and argues that
although they support the existing global discourse on the protection of human
rights, globalization in the long run serves the interests of the economically
powerful countries in the world. Thus, the organization thinks that in the long
run it is necessary that globalization should be resisted, in order to create
democratic global governance. The other human rights organization, associated
with Islamic discourse (Mazlum-Der), presents a softer version of skepticism,
and argues that globalization provides a platform suitable for its activities,
although the liberal discourse of human rights it promotes is problematic in
dealing with cultural rights. On the other hand, the third human right organiza-
tion (Helsinki Vatandaşlar Derneği), which was founded in Europe and operates
in Turkey, views cultural globalization as a problem simultaneously generating
positive and negative impacts for both the nation-state and civil society. That is,
globalization cannot be rejected nor celebrated, but should be dealt with
seriously in order to take advantage of its positive qualities, such as its support
for the universalization of the discourse of civil rights.
To point out the differences between these three human rights organizations
is important, in the sense that they also illuminate a general problem that
confronts civil society organizations in Turkey, and this problem determines, to
a large extent, their approach to the question of globalization. This problem is
the ‘boundary problem’; that is, to what extent civil society organizations in
Turkey are in fact operating as a ‘civil society organization’ in terms of the
scope and the content of their activities, their relation to the state, and their
normative and ideological formations. The general definitional discourse on civil
society in Turkey finds the institutional distinction between the state and society
as a ‘sufficient condition’ for thinking of organizations taking place outside the
boundaries of the state as civil society organizations. In fact, a large number of
civil society organizations we have interviewed make use of this definition in
describing themselves. However, this definition does not involve two important
criteria, used in the literature to define civil society organizations, namely, that
they are issue-specific organizations, and that they are not interested in creating
or supporting ideological societal visions.
When we approach civil society organizations in Turkey on the basis of these
two definitional criteria, we see that most of them act on the contrary, that is,
their activities are not issue-based in scope and content; instead they are
embedded in big societal visions. First of all, there are civil society organizations
whose activities are framed, to a large extent, by big societal visions, such as,
Kemalism, a modern Turkey, the protection of contemporary civilized life, the
secular-democratic Turkey or Islamic order, Islamic life, a socialist Turkey, and
Kemalist Woman, to name a few. Second, we see that while civil society
organizations institutionally take place outside the state, they can have strong
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normative and ideological ties with state power. An illustrative example of this
was the process of closing the Welfare Party, where strong ties were established
between some civil society organizations, the military and the state. In this case,
we witnessed how the search for what is good for society at large could be a
mission around which civil society organizations center their activities.
In sum, as far as the relationship between globalization and civil society, there
is a difference between the intellectual discourse about civil society and the
scope and the content of the activities of civil society organizations. Intellectual
discourse locates civil society in a space that has occurred between the legiti-
macy and the governability problem of the strong-state tradition and the
changing nature of societal relations partly because of the processes of globaliza-
tion, and thus sees civil society as a necessary condition for democratization,
pluralism and multiculturalism. However, most of the civil society organizations
act on the contrary with their ideologically and normatively-loaded discourses
and strategies. This is precisely because of the boundary problem by which most
of the civil society organizations are confronted today. Even though their
numbers are increasing and they are becoming important actors, how civil they
are still remains uncertain. One of the crucial reasons for this boundary problem,
as we will explain in detail in the following section, has to do with the
‘citizenship regime’ in Turkey, insofar as it is the republican model of citizen-
ship that has constituted the ideological foundation for the actor-like quality of
civil society and its identity formation. In other words, without analyzing
critically and problematizing the republican model of citizenship in which civil
society in Turkey is embedded, we cannot understand why most of the civil
society organizations contain normatively-loaded discourses and strategies,
rather than preferring to act as issue-specific organizations.
Civil Society and the Changing Notion of Citizenship in Turkey
A quick glance at the literature on civil society indicates that the activities of
civil society manifest themselves in the relationship between state and citizenry.
In other words, what makes the notion of civil society so integral to such a
diverse array of state–society relations is its direct articulation to the notion of
citizenship. In this sense, it is the question of citizenship that should be taken
into account in the analysis of civil society, in order to account for the possibility
of the use and the abuse of civil society. In this section we elaborate the basic
defining characteristics of the established notion of Turkish citizenship as they
are related to the issues of civil society and democracy in Turkey. However, we
think that it is necessary pause here and redirect our attention briefly to the
conceptual formation of citizenship, in order to have an analytical framework for
an adequate analysis of the republican model of citizenship in Turkey.
Even though defining citizenship is itself a political activity and hence it
means different things to different people (Blackburn, 1994), what is often very
common to these varying definitions is related to the three dimensions that
citizenship involves: status, identity, and activity (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000).
A person’s citizenship status is defined largely by a discourse of the legal rights
and duties that actually operate between citizens and the state. A person’s
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citizenship identity is represented by membership in one or more political
communities which are often compared with other more particular identities
based on race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, and so on. Finally, a person’s
citizenship activity (virtue) is seen essential for a responsible citizenship which
requires some ‘social capital’ such as the ability to trust, the willingness to
participate, or the sense of justice. Although the nature and dynamics of civil
society in any given country is directly conditioned by each of these three
constituting elements of citizenship, among them the aspects of status and
activity are the main elements which link the citizenry to civil society.
Central to the status aspect of citizenship is the notion of ‘citizenship rights’.
Historically and broadly speaking, and with reference to its Western experience
since the eighteenth century, we can suggest that firstly the establishment of civil
rights, second, that of the political rights, and then finally, that of the social and
economic rights; all have directly contributed to the development of civil society.
As Marshall (1965) described them, these three different types of rights are
considered as the main elements of our modern citizenship. The civil rights are
‘necessary for individual freedom, such as liberty of the person, freedom of
speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid
contacts, and the right to justice’. The political rights are related to participation
‘in exercise of political power, as a member of a body of invested with political
authority or as an elector of the members of such body’. The social and
economic rights refer to ‘the whole range from the right to a modicum of
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social
heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards
prevailing in the society’.
There is no room for doubt that the virtue side of citizenship is extremely
important and determining factor in the formation of civil society. As elaborated
by Galston (1991), there are four types of civic virtues which are essentials not
only for a well functioning modern citizenship but also for a flourishing civil
society. These are regarded as the general virtues (courage, law-abidingness,
loyalty), the social virtues (independence, open-mindedness), the economic
virtues (work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic
and technological change), and the political virtues (capacity to discern and
respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for,
ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in
public discourse). What is important here is the social fact that how a citizenship
regime treats its status and virtue aspects is in fact a reflection of its commitment
to civil society. This fact also indicates that through its understanding of civil,
political, social and economic rights, as well as its approach to the general,
social, economic, and political virtues, a state is able to define the sort of civil
society it projects. In other words, a state may use its citizenship regime to define
the borders and the boundaries of its civil society.
If we return to the question of civil society in Turkey, and analyze it from this
theoretical-analytical framework, it becomes clear that the changing nature of
civil society goes hand in hand with the changing dynamics of the citizenship in
the country. Since its establishment the Turkish Republic has been guided by a
series of rationales that view citizenship as serving goals and practices of a
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universal kind reflected in Western political and philosophical tradition (Icduygu
et al., 1999). In these rationales, a civic-republican understanding has been
prevalent in the formation of Turkish citizenship (Soyarik, 2000). The emphasis
has been on duty rather than right, and citizenship is considered to be a social
practice rather than status. As we argued elsewhere (Keyman and Icduygu,
2003), this gives us the picture of the principle of ‘militant/virtues citizenship’,
in which the national-secular identity is assumed to act in accordance with the
organic vision of society, that is, as a citizen-subject who is willing to defer
his/her rights until the point where he or she finishes his/her duties to the state,
even though he or she knows that that point will never come. In this sense, the
citizen is militantly active in the process of serving for the making of modern
Turkey, and is virtuous in his/her will to put the public good before individual
interest, his/her service for society before individual freedom, his/her national
identity before difference, and his/her acceptance of cultural homogeneity before
pluralism. However, it should be pointed out that the militant citizen is only
active in terms of its duties to the state, but passive with respect to its will to
carry the language of rights against state power.
As the Kemalist Republican ideology has tried to carefully construct the
modern concept of citizenship with its own peculiar characteristics, there have
not been many occasions in which the particular notion of citizenship is
questioned and challenged. The Turkish citizenship has received renewed inter-
est in the last 10 years, in a time when we have also observed the impacts of
globalization on Turkish society. This coincidence is often interpreted empiri-
cally in the following way: ‘as the implications of the idea of globalization are
assessed particularly in terms of the possibilities for the governance of the
international system’ (Thompson, 1999) but not of the separate national entities,
the conventional conception of Turkish citizenship (as a national identity and/or
activity) can no longer play its unifying function, nor is it capable of translating
abstract status to concrete rights. It is argued, in this context, that in a
globalizing world the Turkish state is no longer able to operate and maintain its
citizenship policies and practices as a result of both external factors (inter-
national migrations) and internal affairs (ethnic and religious revivals) (Icduygu
and Keyman, 2000).
Of course, both ‘international migrations’ and ‘ethnic and religious revivals’
are not new phenomena. Nor are they the developments specific to the global
era. But they are embedded in the process of globalization and generate
important impacts on the notion of citizenship in two related ways: as directly
puzzling the established notion of citizenship and as deeply contributing to the
flourishing civil society. In the case of the former, as noted by Kastoryano
(2000), international migration leads to an institutional expression of multiple
citizenship, where the country of origin becomes a source of identity, the country
of residence a source of status, and the emerging transnational space, a space of
virtues combining the two or even more countries. Related to this argument, and
in the case of the latter, it is suggested that contemporary international migration
introduces a new mode of participation in public life both on national and
international levels, and consequently ‘reflects the internationalization of civil
society’ (Pellerin, 1996). Of course, here debating the international migration
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and citizenship issues does not only directly refers to the core debates of the
politics of identity/difference under the concept of citizenship. But it practically
relates the migration-based debate to the debate on identity politics.
For instance, there is clear evidence that the emigration of Turkish citizens
itself has contributed to the revival of Kurdish nationalism and political Islam in
the context of a diaspora formation (Sayari, 1986; Abadan-Unat, 1997). On the
other hand, as noted before, the 1990s have witnessed the fact that the previously
excluded peripheral identities began to question the fabricated and imposed
monolithic republican citizenship in Turkey. Thus, civil society has become a
site where identity-based diversity conflicts took place, and involve actors
ranging from democratic forces to non-democratic communitarian political
discourses. An outcome of this process has been the enlargement of civil society,
but not necessarily conducive to democratization. With this background, one can
conclude that the evolving nature of civil society in Turkey are very much
conditioned by the country’s internal dynamics, or inside, and its external
relations, or outside. It is, therefore, very obvious that one should capture the
developments in civil society in the context of global restructuring. In other
words, one could not easily understand ‘the relationship of the state to its civil
society with no or minimal recognition of the existence of other states’ (Taylor,
1996) and that of globalization.
Conclusion: The Possibility of Democracy in Turkey
If we can make a distinction between ‘globalization from above’ and ‘globaliza-
tion from below’ (Falk, 1993), we could argue that civil society in late-modern
times has the potential to play an important role for the possibility of democratic
governance, by providing a space of deliberation for societal forces to transfer
their interests and demands to political society. In this sense, as an area of
political activity ‘from below’, civil society constitutes a necessary condition for
democratizing the state-centric world. This role has to be supported both
politically and normatively, not only in terms of global politics, but also with
respect to national and local political units.
The positive role of civil society in the process of democratization concerns
also the question of citizenship, since it contributes to the emergence of the crisis
of the republican model of citizenship in Turkey, as well as its enlargement to
the extent of including identity claims. In this sense, as a site of politics from
below, civil society creates pluralism in a society, which has been constructed
discursively as organic and nationally homogenous. In this chapter, we have
argued that this quality of civil society has to be supported, but with an
important reservation that there is no causal link between pluralism and democ-
racy. As we have demonstrated, pluralism can also be articulated by religious
and ethnic fundamentalism, which denounces democracy from the outset. This
means that civil society as a space of pluralism can easily be simultaneously
‘used’ and ‘abused’ by fundamentalist discourses to strengthen their communi-
tarian visions of society. These discourses have used civil society in their
challenge to the republican model of citizenship in the name of pluralism, and
at the same time abuse it by rendering it a functional means by which to realize
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their own communitarian strategies to become a hegemonic vision of Turkish
society.
In this context, we have suggested that civil society should not be approached
as a self-glorified phenomenon of late modernity. Instead, we have to view it
from a critical point of view, as a necessary condition for democratization, and
attempt to find ways of transforming it into a space of ‘democratic deliberation’.
The first step for this transformation is to situate civil society in a global-
historical context in a way to approach it critically. To do so, we believe, has the
potential to create a suitable methodological starting point to search for the
possibility of building a ‘democratic consensus’ between state and civil society,
identity and difference, and the self and the other. And it is in this attempt that
the possibility of democracy in Turkey lies.
Notes
1. For details, see Beck (1998).
2. For an extensive survey of the activities of civil society organizations in the areas related to the human
condition, see CIVICUS (1999).
3. It should be pointed out that this argument is not only a theoretical argument but also a thematic and
empirical argument which we have extrapolated from our research on civil society organizations in Turkey,
which was based upon in-depth interviews with the leaders of various effective civil society organizations,
and a comprehensive reading of their publications. This research, which also included economic actors and
popular culture, will be published as: Özbudun, E. and Keyman, E.F. (2002) ‘Cultural globalization in
Turkey’, in: P.L. Berger and S.P. Huntington (Eds), Many Globalizations (Oxford, Oxford University
Press), pp. 296–321.
4. This section is in fact the documentation of the in-depth interviews E.F. Keyman has done with the leaders
of a number of important and effective civil society organizations in Turkey. For more detail, see Öbudun
and Keyman (2002), pp. 312–16.
5. This document can be seen at  http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int  .
6. This document can be accessed at  http://www.abgs.gov.tr  .
7. See the following documentary sources, all of which have been published by the Turkish History
Foundation in Istanbul, namely, as Civil Society Organizations in Turkey (1998), Civil Society Organiza-
tions in Istanbul (1998), and The Effective and Primary Civil Society Organizations (1998).
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